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ABSTRACT
Social Security is widely believed to protect its recipients from inflation because benefits are indexed
to the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). However, the
CPI-W may not accurately reflect the experience of retirees for two reasons. First, retirees generally
have higher medical expenses than workers, and medical costs, in recent years, have tended to rise
faster than the prices of other goods. Second, even if medical costs did not rise faster than the prices
of other goods, as retirees aged, their medical spending would still tend to increase as a share of income;
that is, each cohort of retirees would still see a decline in the real income available for non-medical
spending. We show that, for the 1918 birth cohort, Social Security benefits net of average out-of-pocket
medical expenses have declined relative to a price index for non-medical goods by around 20 percent
for men, and by around 27 percent for women. We explore alternative options for indexing Social
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Social Security is widely believed to protect its recipients from a number of risks, 
including uncertainty regarding length of life and inflation, due to the inflation-indexed life 
annuity form of the benefit. The inflation protection comes from the fact that Social Security 
benefits are indexed to the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers 
(CPI-W). The CPI-W is based on the spending patterns of a broad group of workers, representing 
approximately 32 percent of the U.S. population. However, the CPI-W may not accurately reflect 
the experience of retirees for two reasons. First, retirees generally have higher medical expenses 
than workers, and medical costs, in recent years, have tended to rise faster than the prices of 
other goods. Second, even if medical costs did not rise faster than the prices of other goods, 
individual retirees would still, on average, need to devote a larger share of income to medical 
spending as they age. This means that individual retirees would still see a decline in the real 
income they have available for non-medical spending. In this paper, we explore both of these 
factors, quantify the extent to which they undermine the inflation protection provided by the 
indexation of Social Security benefits, and explore the implications of alternative methods of 
indexing benefits. 
Our analysis is related to the literature on cost-of-living indices for the elderly. Most 
recently, Burdick and Fisher (2007) and Stewart (2008) compare the CPI-W to the CPI-E, an 
experimental consumer price index based on the spending patterns of the elderly, produced but 
not published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Since the CPI-E is intended to reflect the 
experience of Americans aged 62 and older, the main difference between the CPI-E and the CPI-
W is in the weights for the various expenditure categories. The CPI-E has increased faster than 
the CPI-W over the past twenty years, due primarily to the relative rise in health care costs, and   2
the fact that the elderly spend more on health care than the nonelderly, even after taking into 
account the availability of Medicare. Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) suggest that if Social Security 
benefits were indexed to the CPI-E instead of the CPI-W, the Trust Fund depletion date would be 
moved forward by about five years. This result demonstrates that there are important differences 
between the two indices, and that the choice between them is consequential. Other relevant 
research includes Boskin and Hurd (1982), who compute separate price indices for elderly and 
nonelderly households even before the CPI-E was constructed, and List (2005), who reviews the 
issues regarding cost-of-living indices for the elderly, but without as much of a focus on health 
care spending. 
In carrying out our analysis, we examine two major components of medical costs. First, 
most Social Security recipients are also participants in Medicare Part B. The monthly premiums 
for Part B, which recently became means-tested, go up with the increasing costs of health 
insurance as they account for approximately 25 percent of the cost of providing benefits. These 
premiums are automatically deducted from Social Security retirement benefits and have 
increased much faster than Social Security benefits. The dramatic difference in growth rates is 
shown in Figure 1, which illustrates that the monthly premium of Part B has gone up 
approximately 1,600 percent between 1975 and 2011 (i.e., the amount is 17 times higher than it 
was), while the automatic cost-of-living adjustments have accumulated to just over 300 percent. 
Moreover, with means-adjusted Part B premiums introduced in 2007, very high-income 
individuals (with modified adjusted gross income of more than $214,000 in 2011) saw their 
Medicare Part B monthly premiums go from $45.50 in 2000 to $369.10 in 2011. The increase for 
these very high-income people clearly eroded the real value of their monthly Social Security 
benefit. Second, retirees often have substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses, including   3
Medicare deductibles and co-payments, and payments for services with limited Medicare 
coverage, such as nursing home care. 
We show that, after subtracting both of these components of health spending from Social 
Security benefits, available income net of medical expenses for a Social Security participant with 
average out-of-pocket medical spending has, in fact, been increasing more slowly than a price 
index of non-medical goods and services. For example, the average man born in 1918 has seen 
his monthly Social Security benefit, net of medical expenses, rise from $527.85 at the end of 
1983 (when he was 65) to $866.80 at the end of 2007 (when he was 89). However, if his net-of-
medical-expenses benefit had kept pace with inflation in the prices of non-medical goods over 
that time period, he would have had $1,086.13 per month in 2007 after medical expenses. That 
is, his net-of-medical-spending benefit has declined by around 20 percent, relative to the non-
medical goods price index. Similarly, the average woman born in 1918 has seen her net-of-
medical-expenses benefit decline by around 27 percent relative to the non-medical goods price 
index. Of course, these results assume no other income besides Social Security, but a sizeable 
fraction of the elderly depend on Social Security for the majority of their income: 64 percent of 
beneficiaries rely on Social Security for 50 percent or more of their income, and 34 percent of 
beneficiaries rely on Social Security for 90 percent or more of their income.
1 
We also show that if Social Security benefits had been indexed to the CPI-E instead of 
the CPI-W, men born in 1918 would have $961.20 net of medical expenses, falling only 11.5 
percent short of the $1,086.13 needed to hold non-medical expenditures constant in real terms; 
similarly, women born in 1918 would fall only 18.1 percent short. The reason indexing to the 
CPI-E does not fully compensate retirees for inflation is that, even if medical costs remained 
                                                 
1 U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, “Fast Facts and Figures About 
Social Security,” http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2010/fast_facts10.html.   4
constant over time for the elderly, they tend to spend more on out-of-pocket medical expenses as 
they age, crowding out non-medical spending. Thus, each cohort’s Social Security benefit net of 
average out-of-pocket medical spending would tend to decline in real terms even if the price of 
medical care rose at the same rate as the prices of other goods, or alternatively, even if the 
average retiree’s real net Social Security benefit remained constant. 
Both the CPI-W and CPI-E are subject to the usual criticisms of consumer price indices. 
In particular, neither accounts adequately for technological progress or for consumer substitution 
among goods. The CPI-E is subject to additional criticisms, including the fact that it overlooks 
senior citizen discounts and differences in the retail shopping patterns of the elderly, and is based 
on a relatively small sample.
2 The failure to account properly for technological progress can be 
quite serious when it comes to health care. Higher medical costs may reflect the consumption of 
better quality medical care, and retirees may be better off even if they are left with less to spend 
on other non-medical goods. Therefore, we emphasize that we cannot draw any conclusions 
about changes in the utility of Social Security recipients from this analysis. All we show is that 
Social Security benefits may not be fully inflation-indexed in the sense that recipients with 
average out-of-pocket medical spending cannot, from one year to the next, purchase the same 
bundle of non-medical goods with their Social Security benefits. 
Our methodology and results are described in more detail in Sections II and III. Section IV 
discusses the policy implications of changing the method of indexation, and Section V offers 
concluding remarks. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we estimate a model to predict average out-
of-pocket medical spending as a function of age, gender, and race. Second, we estimate average 
                                                 
2 See Stewart (2008) and Budrick and Fisher (2007) for a more detailed discussion.   5
Social Security benefits broken down by age, gender, and race. Third, we subtract Medicare Part 
B premiums, as well as our estimates of average out-of-pocket medical expenses, from these 
average benefits. Finally, we compare the rate of increase in the remaining amount (non-medical 
spending) to the CPI-E for all items less medical expenses. Each of these steps is detailed below. 
A. Out-of-Pocket Spending 
We use Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data from 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004, and 2006 to model the age profile of out-of-pocket medical expenses.
3 Our analysis is 
limited to these years because the definition of out-of-pocket expenses is relatively consistent 
across interviews starting in 1995. The sample includes all individuals aged 65–89. The HRS 
collects data on a wide range of out-of-pocket medical expenses including payments for doctor 
and dentist visits, hospital and nursing home stays, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, home 
health care, and special facilities. Respondents are asked about their total out-of-pocket spending 
over the two years prior to the interview; we divide this amount by 24 to arrive at monthly out-
of-pocket spending. One shortcoming of the HRS data is that it does not include health insurance 
premiums in out-of-pocket medical expenses, including those for Medicare Part B. Later in the 
analysis, we add Part B premiums to predicted out-of-pocket expenditures. 
We regress monthly total out-of-pocket spending (the sum of all the components listed 
above) on a variety of demographic variables, including age, age-squared, gender, and race 
(white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, or other race). The results from our three basic 
specifications are shown in Table 1.
4 Specification 1 does not include any controls for race, but 
allows the level and shape of the age profile of spending to vary by gender by including a gender 
                                                 
3 University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Health and Retirement Study, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/. 
4 Other studies use the log of medical expenses as the dependent variable (e.g., French and Jones, 2004). Although 
we also estimated regressions using the log of out-of-pocket spending as our dependent variable, we prefer the linear 
specifications because, when aggregated, they produce results that most closely match the actual aggregate values of 
out-of-pocket spending. The semi-log regression results are available from the authors upon request.   6
dummy interacted with the age variables. Specification 2 adds race dummies, allowing the level, 
but not the shape, of the age profile to vary by race. Specification 3 includes a full set of 
interactions among race, age, and gender, allowing each race-gender combination to have a 
different level and shape. All specifications include a set of year dummies, which allow the age 
profiles to shift (generally upwards) over time.   
We use specification 1 to construct a preliminary age profile of out-of-pocket spending 
for men and women aged 65–84 in each year from 1983–2007. Predicted values for years not 
covered by our HRS data are assigned the intercept for the closest year in the HRS; for example, 
1985 is given the intercept for 1995 (the earliest year in our HRS sample), and 1997 is given the 
intercept for 1996. Clearly we would expect our predicted profiles to be more accurate for the 
years covered by the HRS data. However, as long as the predicted relative values of spending for 
the age-gender groups are accurate, we can scale the levels to match the overall level of out-of-
pocket expenditures. We do this by aggregating our predicted values using population counts for 
men and women of each age group, and then dividing actual aggregate expenditures for the 65–
84 age group in each year by our predicted aggregate expenditures.
5 These ratios of actual to 
predicted aggregate expenditures are our “scaling factors.” We then multiply our preliminary 
predicted age profiles by the scaling factor for the appropriate year. Figure 2 shows the predicted 
and actual aggregate expenditures for the 65–84 age group, as well as the scaling factors for each 
year. The scaling factors are quite close to 1 for most of the years covered by the HRS data. 
 
                                                 
5 Population counts were obtained by request from the Social Security Administration, and actual aggregate 
expenditures from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Data, 
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/. Aggregate out-of-pocket expenditures by age are reported for 
years 1987, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2004. To impute out-of-pocket expenditures for additional years, the 2004 values 
were adjusted by the rate of growth of aggregate out-of-pocket payments for all ages. This procedure yielded values 
that closely match the actual values in the years where expenditures by age were reported.   7
For example, actual aggregate expenditures in 2006 were 1.06 times the aggregate 
amount predicted by our regression model for 2006. Our model also predicts that a 70-year-old 
male has average out-of-pocket expenses of $125.64 per month in 2006. We multiply this 
amount by the scaling factor of 1.06 to obtain $133.21, our final predicted value for average out-
of-pocket expenditures of 70-year-old males in 2006. Thus, we construct our age profiles by 
using our regression to predict the relative values of average out-of-pocket expenditures for the 
age-gender groups, and then choosing the levels to match actual aggregate expenditures in the 
65–84 age group. 
We repeat this procedure for specification 3 to obtain the age profiles of out-of-pocket 
spending for four groups: white males, white females, black males, and black females.
6 For the 
breakdown by race, we chose specification 3 rather than 2 because there appear to be substantial 
differences in the shapes of the age profiles across races, and the interactions are jointly 
significant at the 1 percent level. Our results — the scaled, predicted age profiles — are 
presented and discussed in the next section. 
B. Social Security Benefits 
The Social Security Administration’s Statistical Supplement for 2008, 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2008/index.html, contains data on the 
average Social Security benefit received by retired workers in December 2007, broken down by 
race, gender, and single year of age. We include retired worker benefits only, not disability, 
survivor, or spouse benefits. We then use the CPI-W to “backtrack” these average benefits to the 
                                                 
6 The procedure is identical to that for specification 1, except that we scale our model’s predicted out-of-pocket 
expenditures to match aggregate expenditures for individuals aged 65–74. This is because our population counts by 
race, gender, and age come from the Current Population Survey, http://www.census.gov/cps/, in which age is top-
coded at 80 for many years in our sample period. As we cannot know whether an individual with a top-coded age is 
younger than 85, we cannot use the aggregate amounts for the 65–84 age group.   8
year in which the group was aged 65. That is, the benefit for a group aged i in 2007 in any year 



















t B  is the benefit received by group i in year t , and  s COLA is the cost-of-living-adjustment, 
or the percentage by which the benefit in year s is increased to arrive at the benefit in year  1  s . 
These amounts are taken to represent what the individuals who are currently in group i would 
have received in previous years. 
Clearly, there is a potential for sample selection bias. Our analysis for each cohort is 
based on individuals who survived until 2007. There is evidence to suggest that there are 
substantial differentials in mortality rates across income groups (Waldron, 2007; Cristia, 2007). 
Thus, the individuals in our sample are likely to be among the higher earners in their cohort, who 
are receiving above-average Social Security benefits. This effect is more likely to be important 
for older cohorts. Additionally, not all of the individuals in the 2007 groups would have started 
receiving benefits at age 65; some may have delayed until age 70 and received a credit. A final 
issue is that, by assuming that the benefit received in 2007 is the benefit received at retirement 
plus the subsequent COLAs, we do not account for individuals who may have switched from 
receiving a retirement benefit to receiving a survivor’s benefit upon the death of a spouse. It is 
possible that a retiree who experienced the death of a spouse might have switched to receiving a 
survivor’s benefit (two-thirds of the deceased spouse’s primary insurance amount) if the 
survivor’s benefit was larger than the initial worker-only benefit. While these three factors affect 
the level of benefits we use as our benchmark, they do not affect our main conclusions of the 
relative differences in benefits from different types of benefit indexation policies.   9
C. Net-of-Medical Expense Benefits 
From the average benefits by race, age, and gender, we subtract the premiums paid for 
Medicare Part B and our predicted out-of-pocket spending on medical care for the relevant age-
race-gender group. Medicare Part B premiums are automatically deducted from Social Security 
payments for those Medicare beneficiaries who do not opt out of Part B (inpatient insurance). 
This includes the vast majority of Medicare beneficiaries. We ignore the means testing for Part B 
that became effective in 2007 and assume everyone pays the standard Part B premium, a 
reasonable assumption given our focus on individuals who depend primarily on Social Security 
for their retirement income.
7 This allows us to track the growth of nominal benefits net of 
average out-of-pocket medical expenses over time for each cohort within a race-gender group. 
We compare this to the growth in the CPI-E for all items less medical expenses.
8 The CPI-E net 
of medical expenses tells us what our groups would need for non-medical expenses at the end of 
2007 in order to have the same purchasing power as they did when they were age 65. 
Additionally, we compute the path of each group’s Social Security benefit, starting at age 65, if 
benefits had been indexed to the CPI-E instead of the CPI-W. This tells us the extent to which 
indexation to the CPI-E would have protected retirees from inflation.
9 
                                                 
7 Means testing was in effect in 2007 for individuals with a modified adjusted gross income over $80,000. 
8 We are grateful to Ken Stewart of the BLS for providing us with unpublished CPI-E data. We have the CPI-E for 
all items less medical care for 1987–2007. We estimate the values for 1983–1986 as follows. Using the weights for 
medical care in the CPI-E for 1987, 2007, and 2008 (the BLS did not retain historical weights for other years), we fit 
a quadratic equation through these three values (with year as the independent variable), and use this equation to 
predict the weights for the other years. Using the fitted weights, we solve for the growth rate of the CPI-E for all 
items less medical care in the formula gt  wt1gt
m (1 wt1)gt
nm , where  t g  is the growth in the CPI-E from 
year t–1 to year t, 
m
t g  is the growth in the CPI-E for medical care from year t–1 to year t, 
nm
t g  is the growth in the 
CPI-E for all items less medical care from year t–1 to year t, and  1  t w  is the weight on medical care in year t–1. 
Using the same procedure for the CPI-W yields estimates of the CPI-W for all items less medical care that are fairly 
close to the actual values. 
9 The COLAs applied by the SSA are based on the change in the CPI-W from the third quarter (Q3) of the previous 
year and Q3 of the current year. For the CPI-E, we only have the December-to-December (rather than the Q3-to-Q3) 
changes; therefore, all our analysis using the CPI-E uses December-to-December changes. While these may vary   10
III. RESULTS 
A. Predicted Out-of-Pocket Expenses 
Figures 3 and 4 show our simulated average out-of-pocket medical spending for all men 
and all women. Figures 5–8 show simulated average out-of-pocket medical spending for black 
men, black women, white men, and white women separately. The two solid lines represent the 
age profiles of spending in 1987 and 2007. However, as a particular cohort ages, it moves from 
the curve for one year to the curve for the next year. Therefore, the age profile for a particular 
cohort is steeper than the age profile across cohorts in a given year. The average out-of-pocket 
medical spending of the cohorts born in 1918 and 1928 are depicted by the dashed lines. The 
vertical bars represent the standard errors of our predicted values.
10 
Overall, average out-of-pocket expenses are higher — and rise faster — for women than 
for men. This result is consistent with other studies of medical expenditures (French and Jones, 
2004; Di Nardi, French, and Jones, 2009). Di Nardi, French, and Jones (2009) show that, after 
controlling for age, income, and health status, men spend about 20 percent less than women on 
medical care. Our results suggest that this relationship appears to be driven primarily by white 
men and women; black women tend to have a lower and flatter profile of expenses than black 
men. 
It is not clear why women overall seem to have higher and steeper expense profiles than 
men. One possibility is that, because women tend to outlive men and husbands tend to be older 
than their wives, there are more elderly widows than widowers. Older retirees living alone may 
have higher out-of-pocket medical expenses because, to some extent, a spouse can substitute for 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the Q3-to-Q3 changes for particular years, the cumulative effect over the years should be approximately the 
same. 
10 We assume that the standard error of the adjusted prediction is equal to the scaling factor multiplied by the 
standard error of the original prediction.   11
paid caregivers. In our 2006 sample, 56 percent of men aged 85 and above are married, 
compared to only 17 percent of women in the same age group. Men aged 85 and above had mean 
out-of-pocket medical expenses of $197 per month, compared with $276 per month for women 
in the same age group. However, married women aged 85 and above had monthly expenses of 
only $181, compared to $295 for single women. Single men’s expenses were only slightly higher 
than those of married men — $198 versus $196 per month.
11 This provides some support for the 
hypothesis that differences in marital status can partly explain the observed gender differences. 
One possible explanation for the flatness of the profiles for African-Americans relative to 
whites is that elderly African-Americans tend to have lower incomes than elderly whites. Current 
Population Survey data, http://www.census.gov/cps/, suggest that 7.9 percent of whites aged 65 
and older are living in poverty, in comparison to 22.7 percent of African-Americans aged 65 and 
older. Thus, elderly whites are more likely to have income and assets that can be used to finance 
high medical expenses. Indeed, Di Nardi, French, and Jones (2009) show that the age profile of 
medical expenses is much steeper for higher-income individuals, with differences in spending 
across income groups becoming far more pronounced at older ages. For individuals in their mid-
70s, medical expenses do not vary much with income; however, at age 100, individuals in the top 
quintile of lifetime income spend more than 10 times as much as individuals in the bottom 
quintile. 
We also note that our simulations of average out-of-pocket medical spending mask a 
large amount of variation in actual out-of-pocket medical spending experienced by the elderly. 
For example, French and Jones (2004) show that individuals face considerable risk of 
                                                 
11 For this calculation, married is defined as either married with a spouse present, or partnered. Single is defined as 
married with an absent spouse, separated, divorced, widowed, or never married. We classify individuals who are 
married with an absent spouse as single because we are trying to capture the impact of living alone. There are 410 
men and 768 women aged 85 and above in the 2006 sample.   12
catastrophic health costs. Our regression results show that only a small part of the variation in 
out-of-pocket medical spending is explained by age, gender, and race. The level of out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures for any one individual may vary greatly from our predictions, and any 
given individual is also likely to experience more variation from year to year than our averages 
by race, gender, and age suggest. 
B. Benefits Net of Average Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses 
To summarize our results, we focus on the experience of two cohorts — individuals born 
in 1918, and individuals born in 1928. The former cohort is 89 at the end of 2007, and the latter 
is 79 at the end of 2007. 
Figures 9 and 10 depict the experience of the 1918 cohort of men and women. In each 
graph, the solid black line shows the evolution of the cohort’s actual Social Security benefit. The 
dashed black line shows the evolution of the cohort’s Social Security benefit if the benefit had 
been indexed to the CPI-E. The solid gray line shows the actual benefit net of average out-of-
pocket medical spending received by the cohort. Finally, the dashed gray line shows the benefit 
net of average out-of-pocket medical spending that would be required to keep pace with inflation 
in the prices of non-medical goods (as measured by the CPI-E for all goods less medical care). 
  These graphs suggest that benefits net of average out-of-pocket medical spending have 
risen more slowly than the price index for non-health spending. The same pattern emerges for the 
four race-gender groups (the graphs are not shown), and for the 1928 birth cohort. The results for 
these other groups are summarized in Table 2. The second column of the table shows, for each 
group, the actual monthly benefit net of average out-of-pocket medical expenses at age 65. The 
third column shows the actual monthly benefit net of average out-of-pocket medical expenses in 
December 2007. The fourth column shows the monthly benefit net of average out-of-pocket   13
medical expenses that would be needed in December 2007 to reflect growth in the non-medical 
component of the CPI-E. The last two columns show the percentage difference between columns 
3 and 4, expressed relative to both the actual 2007 benefit (“Percent increase needed”) and the 
2007 benefit needed to keep up with inflation (“Percent shortfall”). 
For example, men born in 1918 have seen their average Social Security benefit, net of 
out-of-pocket medical expenses, rise from $527.85 at the end of 1983 (at age 65) to $866.80 at 
the end of 2007 (at age 89). However, if this cohort’s average benefit net of out-of-pocket 
medical expenses had kept pace with the non-medical CPI-E over that time period, this amount 
would have been $1,086.13 in 2007. That is, the average benefit net of out-of-pocket medical 
expenses has declined by around 20 percent relative to the non-medical CPI-E. Similarly, women 
born in 1918 have seen their average benefit net of out-of-pocket medical expenses decline by 
around 27 percent relative to the non-medical CPI-E. 
Table 3 shows the benefit net of average out-of-pocket medical expenses that retirees in 
both cohorts would be receiving in December 2007 if their benefits had been indexed to the CPI-
E rather than the CPI-W. The last two columns, again, compare these amounts to the amounts 
that would be needed to offset inflation in non-medical goods prices. This table suggests that 
retirees would have been more protected from inflation if cost-of-living adjustments had been 
based on the CPI-E. However, there is still a shortfall of 10–20 percent for the older cohort and 
6–7 percent for the younger cohort. As noted previously, the reason indexing to the CPI-E does 
not fully compensate retirees for inflation is that, even if medical costs remained constant over 
time for the elderly, they tend to need additional medical care as they age, and the additional 
medical spending crowds out non-medical spending. Thus, Social Security benefits net of 
average out-of-pocket medical expenses would tend to decline for each individual even if the   14
price of medical care rose at the same rate as the prices of other goods. This idea is illustrated 
graphically in Figures 3–8, in the contrast between the solid and dashed lines. A price index for 
medical care reflects the vertical shift over time in the solid line (the age profile of spending in 
any given year); it does not pick up the horizontal movement that occurs as an individual ages. In 
fact, each cohort is moving diagonally — to a higher curve as time passes, and to a point further 
to the right on that curve as its members age. 
Because actual out-of-pocket medical expenditures are subject to a great deal of 
uncertainty, particular individuals may be more or less protected against inflation than shown 
here. We emphasize again that we are not claiming retirees are worse off than they were when 
they were 65. Our analysis does not allow us to make any such utility comparisons. The CPI 
does not adequately account for the fact that higher medical costs may reflect the consumption of 
better quality medical care, and retirees may be better off even if they are left with less to spend 
on other non-medical goods. All we have shown is that Social Security benefits may not be fully 
inflation-indexed in the sense that recipients cannot, from one year to the next, purchase the 
same bundle of non-medical goods with their Social Security benefits. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our results suggest that retirees who depend primarily on Social Security have fallen behind 
substantially in terms of inflation-adjusted non-medical spending. However, indexing Social 
Security benefits to the CPI-E — or alternatively, indexing benefits to keep real non-medical 
spending constant — would clearly have an adverse impact on Social Security’s finances. 
To provide a back-of-the envelope estimate of the impact on Social Security’s finances, we 
begin with our estimates of the rate of increase in aggregate monthly benefit amounts required 
from 2006–2007 if (1) Social Security benefits had been indexed to the CPI-E, and (2) Social   15
Security benefits had been adjusted to keep the real net-of-health benefit constant for the average 
retiree. We construct these estimates by using the number of retired workers in December 2006 
and December 2007 by age and gender, actual average monthly benefits in December 2006 and 
December 2007 by age and gender, and our projections of average monthly benefits under 
scenarios (1) and (2) above.
12 
We find that aggregate benefits for individuals aged 65–89 would have risen by 8.3 percent 
between December 2006 and December 2007 if benefits had been indexed to the CPI-E. Using 
the same methodology, if benefits had instead been adjusted to keep the real net-of-medical 
benefit constant, aggregate benefits for individuals aged 65–89 would have risen by 12.4 percent 
over the same period. By contrast, actual aggregate benefits for this age group rose by only 5.6 
percent between December 2006 and December 2007.
13 
The 2010 Social Security Trustees’ report provides projections of the Old Age and 
Survivor’s Insurance (OASI) program’s income and cost rates through 2085. The income rate is 
defined as OASI tax revenue (from payroll taxes and taxation of benefits) as a percentage of 
taxable payroll, and the cost rate is defined as the cost of the OASI program as a percentage of 
taxable payroll. Using these income and cost rates, combined with the Trustees’ projections of 
GDP and taxable payroll as a fraction of GDP, we can project OASI’s total income and costs 
through 2085. Under the Trustees’ projections of current law using intermediate assumptions, 
total OASI costs are projected to grow at an average rate of 5.6 percent per year between 2006–
                                                 
12 Beneficiary counts by age and gender were obtained from the U.S. Social Security Administration, Annual 
Statistical Supplement, 2008, Table 5.A.1, “Number and average monthly benefit, by type of benefit and race, 
December 2007,” http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2008/5a.html#table5.a1, and the U.S. 
Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2007, Table 5.A.1, “Number and average monthly 
benefit, by type of benefit and race, December 2006,” 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2007/5a.html#table5.a1. 
13 The actual rate of increase between December 2006 and December 2007 is considerably larger than the rate of 
increase in the CPI-W during this time period of 2.3 percent. This discrepancy is due to the fact that the composition 
of beneficiaries also changes over time and, because of differential mortality by income, beneficiaries with lower 
Social Security benefits tend to die earlier than beneficiaries with higher Social Security benefits.   16
2085, in line with our estimate of the increase in aggregate benefits between 2006–2007. 
Consistent with our calculations for the growth in aggregate benefits between 2006–2007, we 
assume that indexation to the CPI-E would increase this growth rate by 2.6 percentage points in 
each year, and that indexation to maintain the real value of non-medical spending would increase 
this growth rate by 6.7 percentage points in each year.
14 
Figure 11 depicts the income and cost rates of the OASI program under current law, as well 
as the cost rate under each of these alternative indexing schemes, assuming the alternative 
indexing took effect in 2010. Under current law, persistent deficits begin in 2018. If benefits 
were indexed to the CPI-E, persistent deficits would begin two years earlier, in 2016, and if 
benefits were indexed to keep real non-medical spending constant, persistent deficits would 
begin in 2015. 
Starting with the assets of the OASI trust fund in 2009 ($2.2 trillion), we project the trust 
fund assets under each of our alternative indexing schemes. For 2010–2019, we assume that 
assets in the OASI trust fund earn the interest rates implied by the Social Security Trustees’ 
short-term intermediate projections of the OASI trust fund ratio and interest income.
15 For 2020 
and beyond, we assume that the interest rate paid on trust fund assets is 5.7 percent, which is 
Trustees’ intermediate projection for the long-term nominal interest rate.
16 Under current law, the 
OASI trust fund is projected to become exhausted in 2040. Exhaustion of the trust fund would 
                                                 
14 Our analysis of net-of-medical cost spending uses only retired worker benefits, and applies only to workers 
between the ages of 65 and 85. We compute estimates of the increase in the aggregate retired worker benefits paid to 
this age group under the status quo and alternative policies. Thus, our estimated growth rates for aggregate benefits 
are not strictly comparable to the Trustees’ estimates of OASI cost increases, as OASI costs include retired worker, 
spouse, and survivor benefits for individuals of all ages, as well as administrative costs. However, our back-of-the-
envelope calculation assumes that the differences in the growth rates of aggregate costs across policies should be 
similar regardless of whether we look at retired worker benefits for workers aged 65–85, or total OASI costs. 
15 These projections are available in the U.S. Social Security Administration, The 2010 OASDI Trustees’ Report, 
Table IV.AI, “Operations of the OASI Trust Fund, Calendar Years 2005–19,” 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2010/IV_SRest.html#280816. 
16 See the U.S. Social Security Administration, The 2010 OASDI Trustees’ Report, Table V.B2, “Additional 
Economic Factors,” http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2010/V_economic.html#205214.   17
occur 5–10 years earlier (between 2030–2035) if benefits were indexed to the CPI-E, and 
between 10–15 years earlier (between 2025–2030) if benefits were indexed to maintain the real 
value of non-medical spending. 
Given the state of Social Security’s long-term finances, switching to one of these alternative 
indexing schemes is unrealistic from a policy perspective. While changes in benefits indexation 
can be done in ways that are revenue-neutral (e.g., by reducing initial benefits and increasing the 
rate of increase), reforms of this nature would raise distributional concerns and would rely on the 
assumption that such a policy would be preferred to one where benefits indexation remained 
constant and beneficiaries utilized other savings vehicles to ensure the adequacy of benefits for 
later medical expenses. Social Security reform proposals generally take into account the need to 
protect low-income retirees from benefit cuts, and many proposals in fact increase benefits to 
low-income earners (e.g., National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 2010). In 
this spirit, it might be reasonable for policy makers to consider an alternative indexing scheme to 
protect very low-income retirees as part of a more comprehensive Social Security reform 
package. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that Social Security benefits may not be as safe from inflation as 
commonly believed. Because medical costs have been rising over time, and because the elderly 
spend a larger fraction of their income on medical care than workers do, the CPI-W does not 
properly reflect the inflation experience of Social Security beneficiaries. This is partly reflected 
in the fact that premiums for Medicare Part B, in which most retirees participate, have risen 
much faster than Social Security benefits. It is compounded by the fact that retirees often have 
substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses, which increase as they age. Even experimental   18
measures like the CPI-E may not fully compensate for inflation because they are intended to 
reflect the inflation experience of the average elderly person from year to year, rather than the 
experience of a given cohort. Given the state of Social Security’s finances, it would not be 
fiscally prudent to raise legislated benefits for all retirees to keep pace with the CPI-E or to 
maintain average real net-of-medical benefits. However, most Social Security reform proposals 
attempt to protect very low-income retirees, and the alternative indexing schemes discussed in 
this paper can provide guidance on how to accomplish this goal.   19
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Figure 1:  Cumulative Percent Increase in Medicare Part B Premiums and Social Security Cost 
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Note:  Medicare Part B Premiums and Cost of Living Adjustment normalized to 100 in 1975.   21
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Figure 9:  Difference in Monthly Benefits using CPI-W and CPI-E, 
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Figure 10:  Difference in Monthly Benefits using CPI-W and CPI-E, 
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Figure 11 
Social Security Income and Cost Rates as Percentage of Taxable Payroll under alternative 
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Table 1:  Predicting Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Age  –20.4* –21.5* –22.3* 
  (11.3) (11.3) (12.6) 
Age-Squared .155** .161** .169** 
 (.074)  (.0739)  (.0824) 
Female  1500*** 1568*** 2236*** 
  (557) (557) (627) 
Female*Age –40.4***  –42.1***  –60*** 
  (14.6) (14.6) (16.5) 
Female*Age-Squared  .273*** .284*** .404*** 
 (.0956)  (.0955)  (.107) 
Black   –40.4***  –280 
   (6.01)  (1341) 
Other Race   –61.1***  –700 
   (7.08)  (1592) 
Interactions  No No Yes 
R
2  0.011 0.013 0.014 
Notes: All specifications include year dummies. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. Specification 3 also includes all three-way 
interaction terms between age, gender, and race. The number of 
observation is N = 58,004. Asterisks denote significance at the 
10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
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Table 2:  Comparison of actual net-of-medical-care benefit and benefit needed to maintain 
ability to purchase non-medical-care bundle 
 
















All men, 79  713.01  924.74 1028.93 10.1%  11.3%
All men, 89  527.85  866.80 1086.13 20.2%  25.3%
White men, 79  736.14  961.57 1062.30 9.5%  10.5%
White men, 89  542.75  898.97 1116.79 19.5%  24.2%
Black men, 79  598.75  763.91 864.04 11.6%  13.1%
Black men, 89  448.92  729.05 923.73 21.1%  26.7%
All women, 79  512.29  666.14 739.27 9.9%  11.0%
All women, 89  456.05  682.57 938.40 27.3%  37.5%
White women, 79  520.24  692.63 750.74 7.7%  8.4%
White women, 89  468.49  700.76 963.99 27.3%  37.6%
Black women, 79  511.09  626.16 737.54 15.1%  17.8%
Black women, 89  406.75  670.33 836.95 19.9%  24.9%
 
Table 3:  Comparison of CPI-E indexed net-of-medical care benefit and benefit needed to 
maintain ability to purchase net-of-medical-care bundle 
 











All men, 79  961.14 1028.93 6.6%  7.1%
All men, 89  961.20 1086.13 11.5%  13.0%
All women, 79  695.12 739.27 6.0%  6.4%
All women, 89  768.45 938.40 18.1%  22.1%
 